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COMPLIANCE WITH MOST FAVORED CUSTOMER 
CLAUSES: GIVING MEANING TO AMBIGUOUS TERMS 
WHILE AVOIDING FALSE CLAIMS ACT ALLEGATIONS 
Mitchell S. Ettinger & James C. Altman∗ 
 Federal and state contracting authorities more frequently are including 
Most Favored Customer (MFC) clauses in contracts for procurement of 
privately manufactured products.  These clauses seek to ensure that the 
contracting authority (typically a federal or state agency) receives at least 
as favorable pricing as other customers making similar purchases.  For 
example, the government agency may request that the contractor warrant 
that the prices it charges under the contract will be as favorable as those 
offered to other parties purchasing similar products of similar quantity 
under similar terms and conditions.  In theory, the request to be treated 
equally to others making similar purchases is reasonable.   
In practice, however, it is challenging to satisfy MFC clauses because 
they often contain ambiguous comparative terms that make MFC 
compliance an onerous undertaking.  Specifically, in a world of complex 
products and services, it often is difficult—if not impossible—to identify 
“similar” products sold pursuant to “similar” terms and conditions.  Making 
compliance even more challenging are those MFC clauses that do not 
define the subset of purchasers (basis of award customers) who are to be 
compared for purposes of determining whether a price adjustment is 
necessary to satisfy the contractor’s MFC obligations.  Some MFC clauses 
are not limited to any subset of purchasers, effectively requiring the 
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contractor to search all U.S.-based sales to ensure compliance with the 
clause.    
This Comment will provide examples of MFC clauses, identify the 
most common problems contractors have in complying with such clauses, 
and provide recommendations for best practices to achieve compliance 
with the Clauses and thereby mitigate the potential for liability under the 
False Claims Act (FCA).1 
I.     GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT OF MFC CLAUSES 
MFC clauses routinely appear in federal and state contracts.  Such a 
requirement reduces the burden on the contracting authority when 
negotiating pricing for the contract by ensuring that the government agency 
will receive the best pricing offered to other parties purchasing similar 
products and quantities.  Because these clauses appear in contracts across 
the country, one would expect that there would be wealth of legal precedent 
arising in the context of breach of contract claims that could be used to 
derive best practices for compliance with such clauses.  Unfortunately, that 
is not the case.  Rather, the Department of Justice and state attorneys 
general enforce these clauses in the context of FCA cases, where treble 
damages and penalties are available.  For this reason, best practices must be 
gleaned from the complaints and settlements in those cases.  
A.   The Federal Contracting Regulatory Landscape 
Federal government agencies, such as the General Services 
Administration (GSA), define the process for the procurement of privately 
manufactured commercial products.2  To facilitate this procurement 
process, the GSA typically negotiates with private companies to execute 
Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contracts governing the sale of goods and 
services.3  A MAS contract benefits private companies because, once 
negotiated and executed, the government lists that company’s products in a 
schedule, which is available to all government agencies.4  The schedule 
 
 1  31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2013).  The civil False Claims Act, which Congress 
enacted during the Civil War era, prohibits the knowing submission of a false claim that is 
paid in whole or in part from the federal fisc.  The statute provides for treble damages and 
up to $11,000 penalty for each false claim.  In fiscal year 2014, the Department of Justice 
collected approximately $6 billion in civil False Claims Act settlements and verdicts.  Id.; 
see also Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-
billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014.   
 2  See 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.103 (2013); see generally 48 C.F.R. § 1 (2013) (codifying the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations). 
 3  See id. § 1.102. 
 4  Id. § 8.402. 
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provides a “fair and reasonable” price at which the federal agencies may 
purchase the listed products or services.  A MAS contract thus allows 
companies direct access to the expansive federal marketplace, where they 
can sell their products in large volume to clients with substantial buying 
power. 
1.   No Requirement to Provide the Federal Government with the Best Price 
 There are myriad rules and regulations governing the sale of products 
and services to the federal government.  Title 48 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and 
various agency supplements, such as the Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS), codify these rules and regulations.5  The 
government designs these regulations to ensure it receives a “fair and 
reasonable” price for the products it purchases.6  However, no regulation 
requires that the federal government receive the best price available in the 
marketplace.  Indeed, although the federal regulations create an affirmative 
obligation for the government contracting officer to seek the “best price” 
available, there is no federal regulatory requirement that the contractor do 
so.  The regulations provide that “[t]he Government will seek to obtain the 
offeror’s best price (the best price given to the most favored customer).”7  
Further, “[i]f the best price is not offered to the Government, [the 
contracting officer] should ask the offeror to identify and explain the reason 
for any differences.”8  Consequently, the government contracting officer is 
not required by regulation to obtain the actual “best price” available in the 
marketplace; the federal regulations acknowledge the business reality that 
“conditions of commercial sales vary and there may be legitimate reasons 
why the best price is not achieved.”9  Rather, the regulations require 
contracting officers to understand the disparities between the price offered 
to the government and the actual “best price” available in the commercial 
sector.10  As this Comment will discuss below, interchanges with the 
contracting officer regarding the contractor’s commercial sales data (such 
as discounts, rebates and special incentives) often serve as the basis for 
False Claims Act allegations. 
 
 5  Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations codifies both the FAR and DFARS.  
See id. §§ 1.101, 201.104. 
 6  Id. § 15.402. 
 7  Id. § 538.270(a).   
 8  Id. § 538.270(c)(7).   
 9  Id. § 538.270(a). 
 10  Id. § 538.270(c)(7). 
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2.   The Price Reduction Clause 
Many government contracts contain a Price Reduction Clause (PRC).  
The federal PRC governs required price adjustments to federal contracts.11  
Through this PRC, the contracting officer establishes a “basis of award” 
customer as the benchmark by which future discounts to the government 
will be measured.  The basis of award customer can be a class of customers 
(e.g., educational institutions) or a specified subset of customers.12  The 
relationship between the discounts provided to the governmental agency 
must remain consistent with those offered to the basis of award customer.  
As the regulations indicate, “[a]ny change in the Contractor’s commercial 
pricing or discount arrangement applicable to the identified customer (or 
category of customers)”13 triggers the PRC.  In addition, the contractor has 
an affirmative duty to notify the government if there is any change in 
pricing to a basis of award customer that would trigger the PRC.14  In 
addition to liability for breach of contract, a failure to comply with PRC 
obligations may serve as a basis for FCA allegations.15  MFC clauses are an 
analogue to the PRC because they too are designed to ensure that 
government purchases are subject to the same discounting practices as 
other customers, including those in the commercial sector.  
3.   Most Favored Customer Clauses 
There is no federal regulatory requirement for the contracting officer 
to include a “most favored customer” clause in a GSA contract.  Indeed, 
there is no standardized MFC in the FAR.  Perhaps it is for this reason that 
the MFC clauses surfacing in federal contracts vary broadly.  Although the 
concept may appear simple in form (i.e., giving the government at least the 
best price offered to other customers making similar purchases), in 
application, compliance with MFC obligations can prove to be quite 
challenging.  The terms of MFC clauses often are broadly constructed 
without consideration to the burden placed on the contractor to comply 
with them.  Consider the following examples:  
 
• Contractor warrants that the price(s) are not less favorable 
than those extended to any other customer (whether 
government or commercial) for the same or similar articles or 
services in similar quantities;  
 
 
 11  See id. § 552.238-75. 
 12  See id. § 552.238-75(a). 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. § 552.238-75(b) (“the Contractor shall report . . . all price reductions”). 
 15  See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012). 
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• The Contractor certifies that the prices, warranties, conditions, 
benefits and terms are at least equal to or more favorable than 
the prices, warranties, conditions, benefits and terms quoted 
by the Contractor to any customers for the same or a 
substantially similar quantity and type of service; or  
 
• The Contractor warrants that prices of materials, equipment 
and services set forth herein do not exceed those changed by 
the Contractor to any other customer purchasing the same 
goods or services under similar conditions and in like or 
similar quantities. 
 
Broad MFC clauses, like those appearing above, are particularly 
difficult from a compliance perspective.  First, there is no limitation with 
respect to the basis of award customer, thus requiring compliance efforts to 
include a survey of sales to all customers.  Second, defining the scope of 
products or services covered as being those that are “similar” renders the 
clause susceptible to competing interpretations as to what the parties 
intended.  Third, additional ambiguity is injected into the analysis where 
the clause defines the triggering quantity only as being “similar” to the 
government’s purchase volume.  It is axiomatic that the quantity purchased 
may affect a seller’s willingness to increase the discount offered.  Fourth, 
what constitutes similar terms and conditions (e.g., warranties and benefits) 
provides yet another layer of complexity that can differentiate transactions 
and remove them from the purview of a MFC clause.  
B.   State Regulations 
Many state contracting agencies include MFC clauses in their requests 
for proposals as a required term for any contract award.  Like their federal 
counterparts, these clauses vary significantly.  Some include a basis of 
award customer that is well defined (e.g., other educational institutions 
within the state), while others contain no limitation on the basis of award 
customer.  We have seen some clauses that include the “similar” quantity 
provision and others that are broader (e.g., similar quantity or fewer).  
Moreover, the state MFC clauses—like those seen in GSA contracts—
contain no temporal limitations when defining relevant transactions, 
leaving to the contractor the burden of determining when the price 
adjustment period for any given transaction begins and ends.  Also like 
their federal counterparts, state MFC clauses are principally enforced 
through FCA cases.     
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As of July 2014, thirty states, including the District of Columbia, had 
enacted iterations of the Federal False Claims Act.16  Local municipalities 
enact false claims statutes, as well.17  As is the case with the Federal FCA, 
invoices and certifications of contractual compliance, whether express or 
implied, may form the basis of an FCA allegation.  Florida, for example, 
requires contractors “at least annually” to submit an affidavit that the 
contractor is in compliance with contractual MFC clauses.18  
II.     ENFORCEMENT OF MFC CLAUSES THROUGH FEDERAL AND STATE 
FCAS 
Although there are no reported FCA cases tried to verdict based upon 
an alleged violation of an MFC Clause, FCA caselaw generally, coupled 
with complaints filed by the government and relators, provide useful 
insight to a company formulating its compliance strategy with respect to 
the MFC clauses.  The allegations in the publicly available complaints 
typically are based on a post hoc evaluation of data relating to commercial 
sales, and the claim that the government should have been offered the 
discounts identified during the review.  Consider the allegations in the 
following illustrative, publicly available complaints: 
 
• Ward Diesel Filter Systems “failed to disclose its actual best 
price . . . Ward submitted false pricing information and falsely 
disclosed that the prices offered through the GSA were ‘equal 
to or better’ than the ‘best price’ offered to ‘any’ 
customer . . . . Ward’s failure to report the pricing changes to 
the GSA is fraud.”19   
 
• “Corning defrauded the government by[] failing to provide the 
government with price discounts provided to private 
customers such that private customers received more 
favorable pricing[.]”20   
 
• “EMC did not accurately disclose its business practices and 
discounts . . . as required by federal law . . . . The defective 
 
 16  See States with False Claims Acts, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION FUND, 
http://www.taf.org/states-false-claims-acts (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
 17  See, e.g., ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA., FALSE CLAIMS ORDINANCE, ch. 485 (2011). 
 18  FLA. STAT. § 216.0113(2) (2011). 
 19  Complaint at ¶¶ 38–40, United States ex rel. Siska v. Ward Diesel Filter Sys., No. 
10CV00111 (D.N.H. Mar. 22, 2010). 
 20  Complaint at 1, United States ex rel. Jones v. Corning Inc., No. 1:10CV01692 
(D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2010). 
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disclosures by EMC led to the government paying 
significantly higher prices.”21   
 
• Oracle “fail[ed] to disclose deep discounts [it] offered to 
commercial customers when [it] sold software products to 
federal government agencies through a General Services 
Administration Multiple Award Schedule.”22   
 
• Network Appliance (NetApp) “promis[ed] to adhere to the 
contract provisions regarding . . . price reduction . . . [but] 
failed to do so. . . . The defendant, during the course of its 
contract with GSA, gave commercial customers higher 
discounts than it gave GSA in contravention of the provisions 
of [the] contract.”23  
 
Although each of these cases involved unique facts and circumstances, 
their unifying theme is the purported failure to disclose accurate pricing 
and discounts—either during negotiations for the underlying contract or in 
the context of post-award pricing of government transactions. 
In Corning, for instance, the qui tam relator alleged that Corning 
provided more favorable pricing to other customers.24   The more favorable 
pricing terms included rebates and free laboratory equipment in exchange 
for purchasing Corning products, which Corning purportedly used “as a 
way to secure or reward customers for their business.”25  For example, the 
complaint alleged: 
[T]he University of Pennsylvania, a private institution, could purchase a 
particular type of cell plate for $131.90 under its . . . Contract.  
Corning’s GSA contract price for the same plates was $89.97.  When 
the University of Pennsylvania received a ‘buy 1, get 1 free’ deal on 
these plates, the price was reduced to $65.95, which is $24.02, or 
approximately 27%, below GSA pricing.26 
The relator alleged that this promotion amounted to a “discount” that 
negated the government’s status as a most favored customer and 
subsequently became actionable under the FCA when Corning certified 
 
 21  Complaint in Intervention at ¶¶ 31–32, United States ex rel. Rille v. EMC Corp., 
No. 1:09-cv-00628 (E.D. Ark. Jun. 6, 2008). 
 22  Complaint at 1, United States ex rel. Frascella v. Oracle USA, 751 F. Supp. 2d 842 
(E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 1:07CV00529 LMB/TRJ). 
 23  Complaint at ¶¶ 26–27, United States ex rel. Kapuscinski v. Network Appliance 
Inc., No. 06CV00675 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2006). 
 24  Complaint at ¶ 20, Corning, No. 1:10CV01692. 
 25  Id. at ¶ 25. 
 26  Id. at ¶ 31.   
8 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 90:1 
compliance with the contract.  Ultimately, Corning settled the action for 
$5.65 million.27 
Recent settlements make clear that FCA cases, based upon purported 
deficiencies in pricing practices, are likely to be the continued focus of the 
federal and state agencies, as well as whistleblowers.  In 2009, NetApp 
agreed to pay $128 million to settle the allegations that it breached its 
pricing obligations to the federal government.28  In 2011, Oracle paid 
$199.5 million to resolve allegations that it “knowingly failed to meet its 
contractual obligations to provide GSA with current, accurate and complete 
information about its commercial sales practices, including discounts 
offered to other customers.”29  Similar allegations in 2012 against hardware 
company W.W. Grainger resulted in a $70 million settlement. 30  In August 
2014, Hewlett-Packard, a manufacturer of IT and other computer products, 
paid $32.5 million to settle allegations that it violated an MFC clause by 
“failing to comply with pricing terms of [its] contract [with USPS], 
including a requirement that HP provide prices that were no greater than 
those offered to HP customers with comparable contracts.”31 
As designed by Congress, the government may not use the FCA as an 
enforcement tool for mere perceived breaches of contract.32  Yet, because 
the FCA does not require proof of scienter,33 it is difficult for contractors to 
establish at the motion to dismiss stage that the action alleges a mere 
 
 27  Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New York-based 
Corning Incorporated to Pay US $5.65 Million to Resolve False Claims Allegations (Mar. 8, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-york-based-corning-incorporated-
pay-us-565-million-resolve-false-claims-allegations. 
 28  Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GSA Contractor 
NetApp Agrees to Pay U.S. $128 Million to Resolve Contract Fraud Allegations (Apr. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/gsa-contractor-netapp-agrees-pay-us-128-
million-resolve-contract-fraud-allegations. 
 29  Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Oracle Agrees to Pay 
U.S. $199.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Lawsuit (Oct. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/oracle-agrees-pay-us-1995-million-resolve-false-claims-act-
lawsuit. 
 30  Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Illinois-based 
Hardware Distributor W.W. Grainger Pays US $70 Million to Resolve False Claims Act 
Allegations (Dec. 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Illinois-based-
hardware-distributor-ww-grainger-pays-us-70-million-resolve-false-claims-act. 
 31  Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard 
Company Agrees to Pay $32.5 Million for Alleged Overbilling of the U.S. Postal Service 
(Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Hewlett-packard-company-
agrees-pay-325-million-alleged-overbilling-us-postal-service. 
 32  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Owens v. First Kuwaiti Gen. Trading & Contracting 
Co., 612 F.3d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[The FCA] does not allow a qui tam relator to 
shoehorn what is, in essence, a breach of contract action into a claim that is cognizable 
under the False Claims Act” (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 33   See 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 1.04[B] (4th 
ed. Supp. 2014). 
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breach of contract as opposed to a basis upon which FCA liability may be 
predicated.  Indeed, the government and relators frequently contend that a 
contractor’s certification of compliance with the contract, whether express 
or implied,34 constitutes a knowing violation of the FCA because it was 
based upon a willful disregard of or a deliberate indifference to the truth.35     
A case alleging an FCA violation as a result of the breach of an MFC 
clause necessarily will force courts to determine the proper interpretation of 
a contract term and, based on that interpretation, whether there was a 
knowing violation giving rise to FCA liability.  The ambiguous nature of 
MFC clauses ultimately should inure to the benefit of the contractor, as a 
number of courts have refused to find FCA liability on the basis of 
imprecise contract terms.36 
The decision in United States v. Data Translation Inc.,37 a case 
involving allegations that the contractor failed to accurately disclose its 
discount practices, provides a practical approach to disclosure obligations.  
Data Translation Inc. (DTI) sold computer boards to federal government 
agencies via a MAS contract at prices negotiated by the GSA.  The 
government brought suit against DTI, alleging it violated the FCA by 
failing to properly disclose the prices at which it sold the computer boards 
to other nongovernmental customers.  The relevant contract term was as 
follows: 
 
 34  See, e.g., Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 531 (10th Cir. 
2000) (holding that invoices submitted after false certifications of compliance with a 
contract were cognizable under the “false implied certification theory” of FCA liability). 
 35  See BOESE, supra note 33, at § 1.04[B] (discussing the lowered intent/knowledge 
requirements of the federal FCA following its amendment in 1986, and stating that “the 
government need only show that the defendant . . . acted in deliberate indifference . . . or . . . 
reckless disregard of the truth of the information”). 
 36  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thomas v. Siemens AG, 991 F. Supp. 2d 540, 568 
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a case alleging that 
the defendant violated the FCA by failing to disclose discounts given to basis of award 
customers, because “[w]ithout more than a relator’s subjective interpretation of an imprecise 
contractual provision, a defendant’s reasonable interpretation of its legal obligation 
precludes a finding that the defendant had knowledge of its falsity.”); see also United States 
v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 248 F.3d 781, 805 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the relator had 
failed to prove an FCA violation where the defendant’s “interpretation and performance 
under the contract was reasonable,” thereby eliminating the possibility that the defendant 
“acted with the requisite knowledge.”); United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 
168 F.3d 1013, 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[I]mprecise statements or differences in 
interpretation growing out of a disputed legal question are similarly not false under the 
FCA . . . [T]he FCA is not an appropriate vehicle for policing technical compliance with 
administrative regulations.”).  But see United States ex rel. Vosika v. Starkey Labs., Inc., 
No. 01-709 (DWF/SRN), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18349, at *10–12 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2004) 
(distinguishing United States v. Data Translation and denying the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss). 
 37  984 F.2d 1256 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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If, subsequent to the award of any contract resulting from this 
solicitation, it is found that any price negotiated . . . was increased by 
any significant amount because the prices, data, and facts were not as 
stated in the offeror’s “Certificate of Established Catalog or Market 
Price,” then the contract price(s) shall be reduced by such amount and 
the contract shall be modified in writing to reflect such adjustment.38  
The court characterized the government’s ‘breach of contract’ claim as 
resting essentially on the proposition that DTI, when it submitting its offer, 
did not “disclose all the computer board price discounts it gave to its non-
governmental customers.”39  Justice Breyer, then a member of the First 
Circuit, opined that “one must examine the relevant provisions, not 
necessarily as the GSA intended them, but rather from the perspective of a 
reasonable person in DTI’s position.”40  The court emphasized that the 
contract should be given a practical—as opposed to a literal—
interpretation.  Justice Breyer observed that “[t]he Government has 
asked . . . this court to read the contract’s ‘discount disclosure’ language 
literally, as requiring DTI to reveal every price discount it provided any of 
its customers ever—a revelation that DTI must concede it did not make.”41  
The court held: 
No reasonable person, negotiating with [the GSA] could have believed 
that the Government really wanted the complete and total disclosure for 
which the language seems to ask. . . . An ordinary business person 
would not seem likely to interpret the form literally, for, read literally, 
the form asks a business to shoulder a compliance burden which will 
often seem inordinately difficult or impossible to carry out.42 
The court concluded that a policy requiring the broad disclosure the 
GSA demanded would create an unreasonable and undesirable compliance 
situation.43  In attempting to fashion a practical interpretation of the 
contract clause, the court’s explanation focused on relevant data.  
Importantly, the court stated that the contract only required DTI “to 
disclose significantly relevant price discounts that DTI normally provided 
other customers making purchases roughly comparable to the agency 
purchases the Government contemplated would occur under the MAS 
program.”44  
 
 38   Id. at 1258 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original). 
 39   Id. 
 40   Id. at 1259 (emphasis in original). 
 41   Id. at 1260. 
 42   Id. at 1261. 
 43   Id. at 1262 (“[A] system that lays down a literal rule with which compliance is 
inordinately difficult, turning nearly everyone into a rule violator, and then permits the 
agency to pick and choose when and where to enforce the rule, is obviously undesirable”). 
 44   Id. at 1263 (emphasis in original). 
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Data Translation supports the contention that MFC contract terms 
should be interpreted with a practical view toward compliance.  The terms 
of such clauses should be interpreted to ensure commercial viability, 
fulfilling its purpose of ensuring that the contracting agency is treated fairly 
in light of other similarly situated purchasers and providing a compliance 
landscape that is not overly burdensome or expensive to implement.45  
III.   BEST PRACTICES FOR COMPLYING WITH MFC OBLIGATIONS 
A.   Define the Basis of Award Customer Narrowly and with Specificity 
When formulating a strategy for complying with MFC obligations, 
companies need to first analyze their IT systems to understand what data is 
captured, the form in which it is maintained, and how readily it may be 
accessed.  The answers to these basic questions will inform the negotiating 
strategy with the contracting agency.  For example, one may wish to 
negotiate the basis of award customer(s) based on how the data is stored in 
the company’s system (e.g., state, local or educational customers).  
Recognizing the inherent limitations on the ability to access and process 
sales and pricing data is essential to understanding what the company is 
able to achieve with respect to MFC compliance.  In this regard, limiting 
the basis of award customer(s) to specific accounts makes compliance with 
MFC obligations feasible. Whenever possible, identify specific customers 
(e.g., “entities X, Y and Z”) or at least a specific business segment (e.g., 
educational institutions within the state).  Limitations of this kind will 
enable the company more readily to conduct the necessary comparisons 
and to establish compliance with the clause.   
B.   Develop a Written Protocol for Compliance with MFC Clauses 
Recognizing, however, that contracting authorities are not likely to 
negotiate the scope of their MFC clauses, companies are left to develop a 
compliance regimen that is practical and will withstand the test of 
commercial reasonableness.  To do so, the contractor must give meaning to 
most ambiguous of terms, including “similar” or “substantially similar” 
products or services, quantities, and terms and conditions.  To ensure 
consistency in application and establish the contractor’s good faith effort to 
comply with its MFC obligations, the contractor should (i) develop a 
 
 45   State caselaw is not well developed as many of the state actions arise in the context 
of a federal suit.  It is reasonable, however, to assume that the state courts will follow the 
lead of the federal courts that have addressed the same or analogous issues.  See, e.g., S.F. 
Unified Sch. Dist. ex rel. Contreras v. Laidlaw Transit Inc., 182 Cal. App. 4th 438, 447 
(2010) (“Given the ‘very close similarity’ of the [California FCA] to the federal False 
Claims Act . . . ‘it is appropriate to turn to federal cases for guidance in interpreting the 
[California FCA].’” (citations omitted)). 
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written protocol to be followed by the individuals responsible for 
compliance with MFC obligations; (ii) train its personnel to that protocol 
and document completion of the training; (iii) periodically audit 
compliance with the protocol; and (iv) make appropriate disclosures to the 
governmental contracting agency at the appropriate time.  
When formulating a protocol for compliance with MFC clauses, the 
contractor must take into account the different clauses within its contracts.  
In this regard, although it may be possible to develop a single protocol for 
use with all MFC clauses, the approach must be based on the specific 
requirements of existing contractual obligations and must be reexamined in 
the context of future bids for contracts.  Although it may be most efficient 
to develop the compliance protocol on the basis of the broadest MFC 
clause, that may prove to be too costly.  For this reason, the protocol 
probably should be written on a generic basis with instructions that permit 
it to be applied to a variety of clauses.  
1.   Temporal Limitations 
The MFC compliance protocol should give definition to the 
ambiguous terms in the MFC clause.  To the extent MFC clauses do not 
provide for any temporal limitations, the company should adopt a 
commercially reasonable time frame for comparison of basis of award 
customer sales.  What is commercially reasonable will depend on the 
volatility of pricing practices in the particular industry—the most volatile 
the pricing model, the shorter the term of comparison.  A solid standard is 
the current fiscal quarter.  In other words, at the end of each quarter, the 
company could look back to the beginning of the quarter to ensure that the 
basis of award customers did not receive better pricing on relevant 
transactions.  If no adjustment is necessary, the company should document 
its analysis, demonstrating its good faith efforts to comply with the MFC 
clause, and maintain the work product in the contract files.  If an 
adjustment is necessary to comply with the MFC clause, the company 
should notify the contracting agency that it is entitled to a credit or rebate 
pursuant to the MFC clause.  
2.   Give Meaning to Ambiguous Terms  
1.  Same or similar products 
The protocol also must address and give meaning to the inherently 
ambiguous terms appearing in MFC clauses.  In some industries what 
constitutes the same or similar products may be readily discernable.  This is 
especially true where there is no ability for the consumer to customize the 
product.  Where the product offering includes different options or is 
susceptible to customization, the protocol should provide a concrete 
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methodology for isolating potentially relevant sales.  It is not possible to 
provide a one-size fits all approach to this dilemma, but the company 
should start with the product model and determine what percentage over 
the list price—due to customization—should be considered within the 
relevant subset of sales.  For example, a model that has a list price for $100 
and options valued at up to $50 has a ceiling list price of $150.  The 
company could pick a range of list prices (e.g., +/- 5-7%) for which it 
would consider purchases of that model to be the “same” or “similar” for 
purposes of applying the MFC clause.  This approach eliminates the need 
to conduct analysis of what options or customization the purchaser 
selected.  This approach is premised on the principle that the sale of the 
same model within a specified list price range, although differently 
equipped, should be discounted similarly.  Alternatively, if the company’s 
IT system facilitates sorting of transactions by model and options, the 
company could design a more specific protocol that is not price-based.   
b.  Same or similar quantities 
The same approach could be used to define “similar” quantities.  Once 
transactions with “similar products” are identified, it is necessary to 
identify the subset of those transactions involving the same approximate 
number of products.  Many variables can affect this analysis.  If the 
potentially relevant like-kind transactions involve only the single product at 
issue, then the analysis is fairly straightforward.  The company need only 
designate a quantity range for inclusion in the analysis (e.g., +/- 5%) (a 
purchase of 100 units would trigger the same product sales of 95–105 
units).  Where the potentially like-kind transactions include other products 
and services, the analysis can (and should) become more complicated.  In 
this regard, the purchase of additional products or services increasing the 
overall purchase price can affect the overall discount offered to a customer.  
If the company isolates only one element of the transaction to compare the 
discount offered on a particular model, it is not truly an apples-to-apples 
comparison.  For this reason, there should be a correlation in aggregate list 
price between the MFC clause order and the like-kind transaction.  This 
requirement would avoid comparing orders with an aggregate list price 
valued at $1,000 with another valued at $5,000.  Again, this can be 
addressed through a designated relevancy range. 
c.  Same terms and conditions   
Finally, the analysis necessarily must take into account the terms and 
conditions of the sale.  Certain aspects of a transaction (e.g., warranties and 
credit terms) may affect end pricing.  Consider the discounting associated 
with the purchase of a new car.  Dealers often offer 0% financing or, in the 
alternative, cash back of a specified amount.  The purchaser is not offered 
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both; it is a choice because the financing terms affect the final purchase 
price.  Extended payment terms or warranty provisions have associated 
costs.  The MFC review protocol should take into account the specific 
terms and conditions offered by the company and should eliminate those 
transactions for which the difference in terms and conditions affects pricing 
to the customer.  This can be accomplished by category (e.g., eliminate all 
transactions that have extended warranties).   
C.   Train and Audit to the Written Protocol 
Once the company develops and implements a written protocol for 
compliance with its MFC obligations, it should conduct formal training 
sessions with the personnel responsible for satisfying those obligations. 
This could include sales, contracting and compliance personnel.  The 
training session(s) should be documented, including written materials used 
to present the protocol, attendance sheets and testing, if appropriate.  In 
addition, period updates to the protocol and training may be necessary as 
the company develops experience and new MFC clauses are added to its 
contracts.   
In addition, the company should audit compliance with the MFC 
protocol to ensure that it is accurately and consistently applied.  The audits 
should confirm that the required evaluations are being conducted on a 
timely basis and that adjustments to contract pricing are achieved in 
accordance with the protocol.  Documentation of the audit results is equally 
important, as it is a further demonstration of the company’s good-faith 
effort to comply with its contractual obligations.   
D.   Notice to the Government of Pricing Adjustments 
Whenever the company determines that a price adjustment is required 
pursuant to an MFC clause, it should use a standardized letter to inform the 
customer of the adjustment.  The notice should cite the specific provision 
of the contract and advise that a credit in a specified amount is due to the 
customer.  Although not required, it is prudent to include in the letter the 
general process followed by the company in arriving at the credit.  For 
example, the notice could advise the customer that the company compared 
transactions occurring in the same quarter that involved the same model 
purchased by the customer having a list price within +/- x percent and with 
an aggregate transaction value within +/- x percent.  Those transactions 
completed under the same or similar terms and conditions (e.g., warranties 
and financing terms) were compared to the customer’s transactions, and it 
was determined that the customer was entitled to a credit of $X.  Such 
notice provides transparency with respect to the company’s MFC 
compliance protocol and creates a further hurdle to any subsequent FCA 
claim premised on noncompliance with the MFC clause.  In this regard, the 
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government knowledge defense prevents the government from claiming 
fraud related to actions about which the government was aware.46  
CONCLUSION 
MFC clauses are becoming more prevalent in federal and state agency 
contracts.  Contracting officers rely on these clauses to ensure that their 
customers receive favorable pricing, and generally are not amenable to 
negotiating changes to their standard clauses.  Those clauses are broad in 
scope, often do not identify a basis of award customer, and contain 
ambiguous terms that require subjective analysis to implement.  Given the 
litigation landscape, where the government has aggressively sought to 
enforce pricing provisions, including MFC clauses, through FCA actions, 
companies need to be vigilant in their compliance efforts.  
Compliance with MFC clauses should be achieved through a written 
protocol that identifies the basis of award customer(s), imputes a 
commercially reasonable temporal limitation where the clause is silent, and 
provides definitions for the ambiguous terms consistent with the company’s 
IT capabilities.   The company should train and audit to its written protocol 
to ensure it is implemented accurately and effectively.  In addition, the 
company should provide written notice to its customers when it determines 
a price adjustment is necessary.  That notice should reveal the general 
parameters of the protocol and the amount of the credit due to the 
customer.  Finally, the company should update its protocol to address new 




 46   See, e.g., United States ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 
F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Today, we join with our sister circuits and hold that the 
government’s knowledge of the facts underlying an allegedly false record or statement can 
negate the scienter required for an FCA violation.”). 
